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The Constitutionality of
Open Space Requirements
and Minimum Lot Sizes

in mind, courts have limited the types of government
actions that constitute a taking and have refused to find
unconstitutional takings solely based on a decrease in an
individual’s property value.

Zoning Regulations and the Takings
Clause

Matthew Weiss
Fall 2007

Open Space Requirements

Introduction
The United States Supreme Court and other federal
and state courts have consistently dismissed challenges
against open space requirements and reductions in
minimum lot sizes similar to those that exist within
ordinances regulating conservation subdivisions.
Although some precedent exists for finding open space
requirements and minimum lot sizes unconstitutional,
courts have only reached such conclusions in limited
situations where the challenged regulations destroy the
entire economic value of a plaintiff’s property, where
there is no rational basis for the regulations, or where
the land use regulation is found to substantially interfere
with the property owner’s use and enjoyment of their
property.

General Grant of Deference to Local
Governments for Land Use Issues
Courts have provided significant deference to local
governments in zoning matters, recognizing that
“[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general
law.”
Consequently, municipalities may control
residential growth to promote the public good under
their police powers as long as those powers are not being
used in a discriminatory manner. With these concerns
 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
 See e.g. Eastampton Center L.L.C. v. City of Eastampton,
155 F.Supp.2d 102, 119 (D.N.J. 2001) (finding that land use

Developers and property owners frequently attempt to
challenge local open space requirements by alleging
that the prohibition of development on private property
constitutes either a regulatory taking or an exaction.
Developers argue that the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, which states that “private property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just compensation,”
renders open space requirements unconstitutional
where they fail to compensate land owners for property
that cannot be developed based on those land use
regulations.
Open space requirements can be viewed in two ways,
depending on the purpose of the open space requirement.
If a locality requires an open space requirement for public
use, courts have engaged in the analysis traditionally used
for exactions. If, however, the open space requirement
is not put to any public use but rather serves as a mere
restriction on the property owner’s right to develop their
property, it is analyzed under the regulatory takings
jurisprudence that has evolved through the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
ordinance that is restrictive but not discriminatory falls within
local government’s police power).
 Steele Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956
(1st Cir. 1972). See also Manor Dev. Corp. v. Conservation
Comm’n, 433 A.2d 999 (1980).
 See e.g. Norman v. U.S., 63 Fed. Cl. 231 (Fed. Cl. 2004)
(assessing open space requirement as regulatory taking); Watt
v. Planning & Zoning Commission of the Town of Kent , No.
CV 990080594S, 2000 WL 1342560 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 5,
2000) (assessing open space requirement as an exaction).
 U.S. Const. amend. V. The Constitution’s Fifth Amendment
has subsequently been incorporated to state and local governments. Chicago, B. & Q.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239
(1897).
 Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. at 386-91 (explaining current test for determining whether conditions on development
constitute exactions requiring just compensation).
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Council and Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York.

the challenged exaction, the Court refuses to require a
mathematical calculation. The Court, however, does
require some type of individualized determination that
“the required dedication is related both in nature and
Open Space Requirements as
extent to the impact of the proposed development.”14 An
Unconstitutional Conditions/Exactions
individualized determination, however, is not necessary
Where an open space requirement serves as a basis for
where the local government can show that an ordinance
requiring that the open space be put to public use, the
was adopted before the filing of a plat application and
Supreme Court, in Dolan v. City of Tigard, established
the ordinance’s requirements are reasonably related to
a two-part analysis through which to assess the
the projected impact of a proposed development.15
constitutionality of the regulation. As the first step, the
court must decide “whether [an] essential nexus exists
Numerous state courts have applied Dolan to open space
between [a] legitimate state interest and the…condition
requirements enacted by cities since the holding in Dolan
exacted by the city.” The Court has recognized such
was reached by the Court in 1994.16 State courts are
things as the prevention of flooding and the reduction
deferential to local governments in determining whether
of traffic congestion as legitimate public purposes for
there is an “essential nexus” between the exaction
which an exaction may be imposed.10
demanded and a legitimate state interest. However,
when assessing whether the exaction is not excessive in
Once an essential nexus has been established, it becomes
light of the impact of a proposed development, courts
the court’s responsibility to determine whether there is a
are less deferential and will require local governments to
“required degree of connection between the exactions
establish that their open space requirement is “roughly
and the projected impact of the proposed development.”11
proportional” to the projected impact.
The existence of a reasonable relationship between
the property’s use and the exaction demanded by the
In Connecticut, for example, a superior court has noted
local government distinguishes appropriate exercises
that the test for determining whether a local government
of the police power from unconstitutional takings.12
may condition the development of a subdivision on
The Supreme Court has used the term “rough
the set aside of open space for public use as parks and
proportionality” to describe the reasonable relationship
playgrounds is “whether the burden cast upon the
required to sustain such exactions.13 To establish the
[subdivision developer] is specifically and uniquely
rough proportionality between the property’s use and
attributable to his own activity.” 17
 See Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 252-87 (analyzing land use prohibition as regulatory taking).
 C.f. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 384 (“the conditions imposed were
not simply a limitation on the use petitioner might make of
her own parcel, but a requirement that she deed portions of the
property to the city”).
 Id. at 386.
10 Id. Even though the Supreme Court invalidated the requirement from Agins v. City of Tiburon, 477 U.S. 255 (1980),
that any government regulation of private property “substantially advance” a legitimate state interest, the Court explicitly
stated that it did not overturn the analysis used in Dolan, arguing that the test in that case and Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission assessed the specific situation where the government attempted to condition an individual’s constitutional right
to receive just compensation for the taking of their property
in exchange for “a discretionary benefit that has little or no
relation to the property.” Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528, 530
(2005).
11 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 386.
12 Id. at 390.
13 Id.



Applying this test in Watt v. Planning & Zoning
Commission of the Town of Kent, the court upheld
Kent’s open space requirement under Part I of the Dolan
analysis, noting that the burden imposed upon the
developer is “uniquely attributable” to the development
of the subdivision because the subdivision would cause
a population increase, necessitating more open space.18
14 Id. The Supreme Court struck down the zoning ordinance
in question in Dolan as applied to the property in question because the city failed to show a reasonable relationship between
its exaction of a floodplain easement and a proposed building
under the second part of the Court’s analysis. Id. at 395.
15 Trimen Dev. Co. v. King Cnty., 877 P.2d 187 (1994).
16 See e.g. Watt, 2000 WL 1342560; Hartman v. The Twp. of
the City of Readington, No. 02-2017(SRC), 2006 WL 2353223
(D.N.J. Aug. 15, 2006).
17 Watt, 2000 WL 1342560, at *8.
18 Id. Courts in other states have found the maintenance of
open space and the preservation of the historical character of
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The courts’ more stringent analysis of the “rough
proportionality” of an exaction in the second part of the
Dolan inquiry is exemplified by Isla Verde International
Holdings v. City of Camas. In Isla Verde the Camas
Planning Commission sought to impose a thirty percent
set aside for open space based on its power under the
Camas Municipal Code.19 Because the Camas Municipal
Code defined open space as “areas set aside and suitable
for active or passive recreation,” the Washington Court
of Appeals evaluated the plaintiff’s takings challenge
under the exactions inquiry laid out in Dolan.20
In assessing the takings claim, the court decided to
use the Dolan two-part exactions analysis despite
arguments that no physical taking had occurred because
title had never been transferred away from the property
owner. The court dismissed this argument, noting
that “alienation of title is not a necessary predicate to
a taking; the essence of the harm is the government’s
unconstitutional interference with one’s right to use and
enjoy property.”21 Because the city ordinance required
a set-aside of land for wildlife preservation, which the
court considered a “public benefit,” the court viewed
the ordinance as an exaction that interfered with the
plaintiffs’ fundamental right to improve their property.22
Having decided to analyze the ordinance as an exaction,
the court applied the Dolan inquiry. Part I of the Dolan
test was easily satisfied because the court found that
there was an essential nexus between the open space
requirement and the proposed subdivision’s destruction
of thirteen acres of preexisting open space. The court,
however, determined that the city’s evidentiary showing
was insufficient to establish “rough proportionality”
between the thirty percent set aside and plaintiff’s
proposed 32 lot development.23 Specifically, the court
noted the absence of studies or formulas establishing
a community to satisfy the “essential nexus” required by the
Court in Dolan. See e.g. Hartman v. The Township of Readington, 2006 WL 2353223 (finding essential nexus and rough
proportionality requirements met for ordinance imposing open
space requirement on new residential developments).
19 990 P.2d 429, 432 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999).
20 Id. at 432 n.1 (citing Camas, Wash., Code § 18.62.020(B)
(1999)).
21 Id. at 435.
22 Id. at 436.
23 Id. at 436-37.

why a thirty percent set aside was necessary for the
construction of the subdivision.24 Because the city failed
to meet its minimal required showing that its exaction
was proportional to the impact of the development, the
court determined that the thirty percent set aside violated
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.25
The Washington Court of Appeals’ assessment of the
Camas Open Space Ordinance under the Dolan exactions
analysis rather than under the Penn Central regulatory
takings analysis has been explained on a number of
grounds. The appellate court itself explained that the
language from City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes
relied upon by the City of Camas, which limited the Dolan
exactions analysis to situations where the government
had actually taken a portion of private property for a
public use, was merely non-binding dicta.26 Further, the
court noted that notwithstanding the language from Del
Monte Dunes, the open space requirement in the present
case was an exaction because the property owner was
required to turn over possession of the property to “a
permanent protective mechanism acceptable to the
City.”27 Therefore, the city’s requirement in this case
that the open space be turned over to a neighborhood
homeowners’ association led the court to determine that
the open space requirement was an exaction that required
just compensation.28 In addition to the city ordinance’s
requirement that landowners turn over the open space to a
protective mechanism, the ordinance had other language
that suggested that a primary purpose of the open space
requirement was public use of the property. Specifically,
the ordinance required that the open space be suitable for
“active or passive recreation”29 and provided that half of
24 Id.
25 Id. at 437.
26 Id. at 436 n.3.
27 Id. See also CMC § 18.62.020(B) (specifying separate
tracts, protective easements, and dedication to public agencies
or private land trusts as protective mechanisms that would be
acceptable to city).
28 Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, 990 P.2d at 436 n. 3. The Washington Court of Appeals, in a departure from most accepted
case law on the topic, determined that any set-aside which
required the preservation of land by turning it over to a private
homeowners’ association constituted a dedication of the land
for public use. Telephone Interview with W. Dale Kamerrer,
Senior Partner, Law, Lyman, Daniel, Kamerrer & Bogdanovich, P.S., in Olympia, Wash. (Sep. 14, 2007).
29 Isla Verde Int’l Holdings, 990 P.2d at 432 n. 1 (citing CMC
§ 18.62.020(B)).
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the open space on a given property could be credited property owner in New Milford, contended that the city
towards the city’s “Open Space Network.”30
had imposed a taking because it had not engaged in an
individual determination of whether the fifteen percent
Other literature has looked to other considerations in open space requirement bore a sufficient relationship to
assessing the Washington Court of Appeals’ decision to the impact of the proposed subdivision.34
classify the Camas Open Space ordinance as an exaction.
Some have argued that the ordinance was found to be an In its analysis of the plaintiff’s claim, the court
unconstitutional exaction because it provided the city’s concluded that legislatively imposed open space
zoning board with significant permitting authority, vesting requirements were distinct from adjudicatively imposed
in it “a large amount of discretion and the [consequent] open space requirements because they did not require
opportunity to abuse that discretion.”31 Still others the individualized determinations referenced in
have sided with the Washington Court of Appeals by Dolan.35 Rather, where entire open space requirement
noting that Del Monte Dune’s discussion of when to use ordinances were challenged on their face, they enjoyed
exactions was merely a statement of historical fact that “a presumption of constitutionality” because the burden
the Court had not previously applied the Dolan exactions rested with the party challenging the regulation.36
inquiry to cases involving permit denials rather than a
pronouncement that the Dolan inquiry could never be Open Space Requirements as Regulatory
used in the future to assess such permit denials absent
some form of dedication, easement, or conveyance of Takings
Even though open space requirements are frequently
land to the government.32
analyzed as exactions, open space requirements placed
While courts will frequently require local planning and on conservation subdivisions, or “cluster developments,”
zoning commissions to engage in individual inquiries would likely not be considered exactions subject to the
when imposing open space requirements exacting analysis used in Dolan or Nollan v. California Coastal
property as conditions of particular developments, courts Commission. Whereas open space requirements that
have afforded a higher level of deference when the open are classified as exactions often require public use
space requirements are created as part of generally- of the open space, in conservation subdivisions the
principal alleged harm of an open space requirement is
applicable ordinances.
that the property owner is denied the ability to develop
One case in which courts assessed a facial challenge to a certain portion of their property. Accordingly, “the
an open space requirement was Dunham v. Planning rule applied in Dolan…[is] not designed to address,
Commission of the Town of New Milford. In Dunham the and is not readily applicable to…questions arising
town of New Milford sought to impose a fifteen percent where…the landowner’s challenge is based not on
37
open space requirement for public use. 33 The plaintiff, a excessive exactions but on denial of development.”
Therefore, considerations of “rough proportionality”
30 C.f. id. at 432 n. 1 (citing CMC § 18.62.020(C)) (acknowledging that, at times, open space could be developed for “active recreation”).
31 Jane C. Needleman, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When
Nollan and Dolan Should Be Triggered, 28 Cardozo L. Rev.
1563, 1578-79 (2006); see also id. at 1581 (noting that Washington Court of Appeals addressed “head-on” potential for City
of Camas to abuse its power in permitting context).
32 John J. Delaney, Applicability of Nollan-Dolan Rough
Proportionality Requirements to Non-Possessory Exactions
and Exactions Imposed by Legislative Enactment, in ALI-ABA
Course of Study 2000, at 639, 647 (ALI-ABA Land Use Institute Aug. 19, 2000), available at http://law.wustl.edu/landuselaw/delaneyI.html.
33 Dunham v. Planning Comm’n of the Town of New Milford,
No. CV010085538, 2002 WL 31124552, at *7 (Conn. Super.



Ct. Aug 20, 2002). The open space requirement was viewed as
an exaction of property for public use based on accompanying
regulatory language that required “open space to have direct
access to a public street.” Dunham at *1 (citing New Milford,
Conn., Rev. Ordinances § 2.9.2)
34 Id.
35 Id. at *8.
36 Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 n.8. See also Hardy Farm Ltd.
P’ship v. Southbury Planning Comm’n, No. CV990363908,
2001 WL 548919 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 4, 2001) (finding that
city acted within its police power in amending zoning ordinance to increase open space requirement from ten percent to
fifteen percent).
37 City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687, 703
(1999).
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and whether there is a “substantial nexus” between the
proposed development and the open space requirement
are not applicable to an analysis of whether an open
space requirement within a conservation subdivision
constitutes a regulatory taking.38

space on a 2,425 acre parcel of land.43 Development
of the property was conditioned upon submitting the
development plans to the Army Corps of Engineers to
grant a Section 404 permit under the Clean Water Act.44
Under the permit ultimately issued by the Army Corps
of Engineers, the property owners were required to
In situations where individuals allege that a government preserve 220.85 acres of the property as wetlands with
regulation has interfered with their ability to make a deed of restrictions that “prohibited all development
productive economic use of their property, courts have on the wetlands areas…and required that the wetlands
classified the government action as a traditional taking, area be maintained as open space.”45 The plaintiffs
requiring an analysis entirely distinct from the Dolan challenged the permitting requirements, arguing that
exactions inquiry, which assesses the physical taking of the condition that they maintain the wetlands acreage as
property as a condition for a government benefit.39 Once open space constituted a taking of their property without
the court has established that a physical taking has not just compensation.46
occurred, the court then assesses whether a government’s
regulation constitutes a regulatory taking. Under the In its assessment of how to analyze the plaintiffs’ takings
Supreme Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence, the claim, the Court of Federal Claims first determined
first question asked is “whether a particular claimed that a requirement to preserve a portion of property
taking [is] ‘categorical’ or not.”40 A property owner can for conservation did not constitute a physical taking.
demonstrate that the government, through regulation, Noting that a physical taking of property required an
has caused a ‘categorical taking’ if the regulation has “exclusive and permanent occupation by the government
denied the property owner “all economically beneficial that destroys the owner’s right to possession, use and
or productive use of [their] land.”41 If no categorical disposal of the property,”47 the court determined that no
taking is found, the court must analyze whether there physical taking had occurred in the present case because
has been a regulatory taking through the three-part the government did not occupy or physically possess
balancing test established by the Supreme Court in Penn the property.48 Rather, the court determined that the
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.42
plaintiffs alleged “a classic regulatory taking.”49
Even though there is limited case law on whether
conservation subdivision open space requirements
violate the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, other cases
have considered instances in which the government has
placed restrictions on the use of an individual’s property
in much the same way that a city or county would restrict
the use of a portion of a property owners’ property under
a conservation subdivision open space requirement. In
Norman v. United States, for example, a property owner
wanted to develop commercial and industrial office
38 Id.
39 See e.g. Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 243 (“The longstanding
distinction between acquisitions of property for public use and
regulations prohibiting private use makes it inappropriate to
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents
for the evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory
taking.”).
40 Rith Energy, Inc. v. U.S., 247 F.3d 1355, 1362 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
41 Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
42 438 U.S. 104 (1978).

Restricting a portion of a parcel of land from development
also does not constitute a categorical taking, which
only occurs in “the extraordinary circumstance when
no productive or economically beneficial use of land is
permitted.”50 Because courts look at the entire parcel of
land owned by the property owner, anything short of a
100% open space requirement would not be classified
as a categorical taking.51 Therefore, any open space
requirement imposed for conservation purposes would
be analyzed under the specific factors set forth by the
Supreme Court in Penn Central.52 The Court of Federal
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

63 Fed. Cl. at 234.
Id.
Id. at 240.
Id. at 233-34.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 248.
Id.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017.
Walcek v. United States, 303 F.3d 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
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Claims reached this conclusion in Norman, where it
determined that the required set aside for wetlands
preservation only decreased the amount of property
available for usage by 10%.53

have frequently found an insufficient diminution in the
value of property to justify a taking even where the
property suffered a decrease in value of close to 50%.57
Notwithstanding the wide discretion afforded to courts,
they generally require a showing of a “serious financial
loss” to establish the basis for a taking.58 Accordingly,
even though a determination of the economic impact
would be highly fact-specific, unless a developer suffers
a serious financial loss from an open space requirement,
it is unlikely that this factor would weigh in favor of
finding a regulatory taking.

Under the Penn Central analysis for regulatory takings,
courts look to three factors when deciding whether a
government action requires just compensation: “(1)
the extent to which the regulation has interfered with
the property owner’s reasonable investment-backed
expectations; (2) the economic impact of the regulation
on the claimant; and (3) the character of the governmental
The final factor considered under Penn Central is the
action at issue.”54
“character of the government action” that causes the
The “reasonable investment-backed expectations” diminution in the value of the plaintiff’s property. Here,
segment of the analysis questions whether the land use the court is required to balance “the liberty interest of
restriction was in place prior to the plaintiff’s acquisition the private property owner against the government’s
of the property, based on the principal that “[o]ne who need to protect the public interest through imposition
buys with knowledge of a restraint assumes the risk of of a restraint.”59 Finally, even when the government
economic loss.”55 If an open space requirement was purpose is legitimate, courts must determine whether
passed after individuals had already purchased the the government action is unfair to the plaintiff because it
affected property, this factor would weigh in favor of places the burden of remedying a larger societal problem
disproportionately on the plaintiff’s shoulders.60
finding a regulatory taking.
In the second part of the analysis, assessing the
“economic impact of the regulation,” a court generally
looks to the change in the fair market value of the
property caused by the challenged regulation.56 What
constitutes a sufficiently severe economic impact
to justify compensation has been a topic of debate
among courts. While it is clear that there will be no
compensation in cases like Norman, where the court
found that the open space requirement actually increased
the value of the property, how much of a diminution in
property is necessary to establish a regulatory taking is
subject to the discretion of the individual court. Courts
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 330 (2002).
53 Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 261.
54 Id. at 261 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
55 Creppel v. U.S., 41 F.3d 627, 632 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Even
though the regulatory status of property upon acquisition is
highly persuasive in determining investment-backed expectations, it is not decisive. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S.
606 (2001).
56 Walcek v. U.S., 49 Fed. Cl. at 258. See also U.S. v. Cartwright, 411 U.S. 546, 551 (1973) (defining fair market value as
“the price at which the property would change hands between
a willing buyer and a willing seller…both having reasonable
knowledge of the relevant facts.”).



It is likely that courts would find that the character of the
government action imposing an open space requirement
on conservation subdivisions supports a finding that there
has not been a taking. Federal courts have previously
found that societal concerns for ecological preservation
supersede plaintiffs’ interest in having the liberty to use
their property as they wish. In Norman, for example, the
court determined that the preservation of wetlands was
a “legitimate public welfare obligation.”61 Similarly,
in Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed District, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that a land use
57 See Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993) (Supreme Court found that
46% diminution of value did not constitute regulatory taking);
Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. U.S., 57 Fed. Cl. 115, 125, 129 (2003)
(finding 49.6% decrease in value did not constitute “severe
economic impact”).
58 Cienega Gardens v. U.S., 331 F.3d 1319, 1340 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
59 Walcek, 49 Fed. Cl. at 270.
60 Chenega Gardens, 331 F.3d at 1340.
61 Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 282. The court in Norman specifically stated that the preservation of wetlands was a necessary
government function because of the role that wetlands play in
“water purification and water quality enhancement…and erosion and sedimentation control functions.” Id.
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ordinance prohibiting development of the lower level of
a floodplain was justified in light of the public interests
it was intended to serve.62 Additionally, if an open space
requirement is applied uniformly to all areas designated
as conservation subdivisions, courts would be unlikely
to find that the governmental action disproportionately
imposes a burden on any single plaintiff.63
Even though any judicial assessment of the
constitutionality of an open space requirement that
does not provide just compensation will be very factspecific, under the Penn Central factors, most open
space ordinances are not likely to be classified as
unconstitutional takings. Even though an argument can
be made that a property owner’s investment-backed
expectations support finding a taking where a land use
ordinance is enacted after their purchase of the property,
because an open space requirement’s economic impact
would likely not be substantial and because an open
space requirement serves valid government purposes
and generally does not impose a disproportionate burden
on any single plaintiff, when taken as a whole the Penn
Central factors weigh against finding a regulatory
taking.

Minimum Lot Size Ordinances

As with minimum open space requirements, courts
are hesitant to get involved in local zoning and land
use disputes involving minimum lot size ordinances
lest they assume the role of a “super zoning board.”64
Despite this hesitancy, however, courts are willing to
award compensation in those circumstances where a
minimum lot requirement either completely deprives
property of its economic value 65 or is supported by all
three elements of the Penn Central analysis.66

governments in crafting land use planning ordinances.67
In that case, Sunnyvale, Texas enacted a minimum lot
size requirement of one acre for all residences.68 A
major landowner in the city sought to create a residential
development with a density of three units per acre.69
Ultimately, the property owner sued the town when
the Zoning Commission rejected his application for the
development.70
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Texas found the
city’s explanation for its denial, a desire to preserve
the overall character of the community and to protect
it from the effects of urbanization, to be a legitimate
state interest. Similarly, the court found that a minimum
lot size did not totally destroy the economic value
of the property.71 The court noted that, even after the
minimum lot size ordinance, the value of the property
was still $2.4 million.72 Finally, the court found that the
minimum lot-size ordinance did not interfere with the
plaintiff’s reasonable investment-backed expectations
because the town had maintained the same one acre
minimum lot size requirement for twelve years prior to
the plaintiff’s proposal to build 3,600 units on its 1,200
acres of property. Accordingly, the court concluded, any
expectation of building such a development could not
have been “reasonable.”73
Similarly, in LaSalle National Bank v. City of Highland
Park a plaintiff purchased two lots in Highland Park,
Illinois.74 Subsequently, the city reduced the permitted
minimum lot size of the property from 40,000 square
feet to 12,000 square feet and granted permits for
the development of two subdivisions. 75 Before the
plaintiff’s subdivision was approved, however, the city
increased the minimum lot size to 20,000 square feet.
The plaintiff sued alleging that the action constituted a

City of Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale provides an
example of the deference that courts provide to local 67 Mayhew v. Town of Sunnydale, 964 S.W.2d 922 (Tex.
62 See Krahl v. Nine Mile Creek Watershed Dist., 283 N.W.2d
538, 543 (Minn. 1979) (adding that “floodplain and wetlands
regulations…have generally been held not to constitute takings
of private property”).
63 See Id. at 287 (finding no disproportionate burden where
plaintiff was treated by Army Corps in fair and even-handed
manner).
64 Id. at 933 (citing Goss v. City of Little Rock, 90 F.3d 306,
308 (8th Cir. 1996)).
65 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1030-31.
66 Penn Central Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.

1998).
68 Id. at 925.
69 Id. at 926.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 938.
72 Compare Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (finding that regulatory taking based on
elimination of all property value only occurs where the property is left “economically idle”).
73 Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 937-38.
74 799 N.E.2d 781 (Ill. App. 2003).
75 Id. at 785-86.
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taking without just compensation.76
The Illinois Court of Appeals quickly identified a
legitimate government interest, noting “a sufficient
nexus…between reducing density and…prevent[ing
the] construction of lots of substandard size.”77 Further,
because the minimum lot size at the time of the
plaintiff’s purchase of the property was 40,000 square
feet, the court determined that the subsequent effective
decrease of the minimum lot size to 20,000 square
feet did not interfere with the plaintiff’s investmentbacked expectations.78 Finally, the court determined
that the increase of the minimum lot-size from 12,000
to 20,000 square feet merely diminished the value of the
plaintiff’s property but did not completely destroy its
economic value, suggesting a minimal economic impact
under the Penn Central analysis.79 Accordingly, the
court concluded that the fact that the minimum lot size
ordinance deprived the property of its most profitable
use was an insufficient basis for finding that a regulatory
taking had occurred.80
Even where it appears that a city has altered its land use
regulations in a way that significantly impacts a property
owner’s investment-backed expectations, some case
law suggests that the judicial presumption in favor of
local zoning regulations will lead courts to require very
significant harm to those expectations before they are
willing to find a regulatory taking.
This presumption was seen in Marshall v. Board of
County Commissioners, where the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming found that a plaintiff’s
investment-backed expectations were not sufficiently
diminished to establish a regulatory taking where the
county imposed a five acre minimum lot requirement
when the plaintiff sought a permit to develop a
subdivision.81 Notwithstanding the plaintiff’s claims
that the county undermined his investment-backed
expectations by reducing the number of lots he could
place on the subdivision from twenty-three to seven,
76 Id.
77 Id. at 797.
78 Id. (noting that plaintiffs had “plaintiffs had full knowledge
of the land use regulation when they purchased the property”).
79 Id. at 798 (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 131).
80 Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592 (1962).
81 Marshall v. Board of County Commissioners, 912 F.Supp.
1456, 1459-60 (D. Wyo. 1996).



the Court, applying the factors from Penn Central,
determined that no regulatory taking had occurred
because there had not been a “complete destruction
of [the] plaintiff’s investment backed expectations.”82
Accordingly, absent a complete diminution of the
plaintiff’s reasonable investment backed expectations,
the court was unwilling to find a regulatory taking.
Marshall evidences courts’ general hesitancy to construe
minimum lot size requirements as regulatory takings
when applying the factors from Penn Central.

Regulatory Takings Under the Georgia
Constitution

Like the United States Constitution, the Constitution
of the State of Georgia provides a basis for just
compensation when the government takes private
property.83 When assessing whether the government has
affected a regulatory taking, the Georgia Supreme Court
has determined “that a zoning classification may only
be justified if it bears a substantial relation to the public
health, safety, morality or general welfare. Lacking such
justification, the zoning may be set aside as arbitrary or
unreasonable.”84 Accordingly, “if the zoning regulation
results in relatively little gain or benefit to the public
while inflicting serious injury or loss on the owner,
such regulation is confiscatory and void.”85 In Guhl
v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp., the Supreme Court
of Georgia adopted six specific factors to use when
conducting a regulatory takings analysis.
(1) existing uses and zoning of nearby
property; (2) the extent to which property
values are diminished by the particular
zoning restrictions; (3) the extent to which the
destruction of property values of the plaintiffs
promotes the health, safety, morals or general
welfare of the public; (4) the relative gain
to the public, as compared to the hardship
imposed upon the individual property owner;
(5) the suitability of the subject property for the
zoned purposes; and (6) the length of time the
property has been vacant as zoned considered
in the context of land development in the area
82 Id. at 1474 (emphasis added).
83 Ga. Const. art. I, § III, ¶ 1 (“private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public purposes without just and adequate compensation being first paid”).
84 Barrett v. Hamby, 235t Ga. 262 (Ga. 1975).
85 Id.
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in the vicinity of the property.”86
Georgia courts have placed the burden on the plaintiff
to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a
zoning ordinance creates a significant detriment for a
landowner and is simultaneously unrelated to the public
health, safety, morality, and welfare.87 Absent this
showing, a zoning ordinance’s presumption of validity
will prevail.88
Under the balancing test that the Georgia Supreme Court
established in Barrett v. Hamby and elaborated on in Guhl,
the government has consistently upheld regulations that
impose a prohibition on the development of a portion
of an individual’s property.89 The court imposed a high
standard for finding a substantial burden on the plaintiff
to justify compensation, noting that “[m]any regulations
restrict the use of property, diminish its value or cut
off certain property rights, but no compensation for
the property owner is required.”90 Alternatively, the
Supreme Court of Georgia has construed the public
interest liberally, noting that “the concept of public
welfare is broad and inclusive” incorporating values that
are spiritual, physical, aesthetic, and monetary.91
The court’s narrow construction of private burdens and
broad construction of public interest suggest that it would
not find land use restrictions in conservation subdivisions
to be regulatory takings. The court has reached this
holding previously for regulations that similarly
restricted the use of portions of private property. For
example, in Pope v. City of Atlanta, the Supreme Court
of Georgia upheld standards imposed by the Atlanta
Regional Commission pursuant to the Metropolitan
River Protection Act that limited the impervious cover
in a fifty-year floodplain to 20%.92 A property owner
within the floodplain challenged the impervious surface
standard as an unconstitutional taking. The court,
86 Guhl v. Holcomb Bridge Road Corp., 238 Ga. 322, 323-24
(Ga. 1994) (quoting LaSalle Nat’l Bank v. Cnty. of Cook, 208
N.E.2d 430 (Ill. 1965)).
87 Gradous v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Richmond Cnty, 256 Ga. 469
(1986).
88 Parking Ass’n of Ga. v. Cty. of Atlanta, 264 Ga. 764 (Ga.
1994).
89 See e.g. Parking Ass’n of Ga., 264 Ga. at 765; Pope v. Cty.
of Atlanta, 242 Ga. 331, 335 (Ga. 1978).
90 Pope, 242 Ga. at 334.
91 Parking Ass’n, 264 Ga. at 766.
92 Pope, 242 Ga. at 332-33.

noting the State of Georgia’s constitutional authority to
restrict land use for the protection of natural resources
and the environment, concluded that the impervious
surface coverage limitation related to the public health
and safety because it prevented surface water run-off
and soil erosion.93 Because the plaintiff’s property
value was only partially diminished and the impervious
surface limit served an important public interest, the
court found that the City of Atlanta was acting within
its police power and, therefore, had not affected a
regulatory taking.94 The court’s holding in Pope might
be even more persuasive in the context of an open space
requirement within a conservation subdivision, as there
would likely be no decrease in the property value of a
development due to the fact that that the number of lots
on the property would not decrease.95
Similarly, in Parking Association of Georgia v. City of
Atlanta, the City of Atlanta imposed an ordinance that
required parking lots to have landscaped areas equal to
at least ten percent of the paved area of the parking lot.96
The Parking Association of Georgia filed suit alleging
that the ordinance was an unconstitutional taking.97 After
determining that such a regulation required assessment
under the court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,98 the
Supreme Court of Georgia found that the ordinance
was not an unconstitutional taking merely because it
deprived the plaintiff of its most profitable economic use
of the property when the ordinance furthered the valid
public interest of beautifying the city.99 Accordingly,
the Supreme Court of Georgia would likely also
determine that the state constitution’s prohibition on
uncompensated takings does not require compensation
for individuals impacted by open space or minimum lot
size requirements within conservation subdivisions.

93 Id. at 335.
94 Id.
95 C.f. Norman, 63 Fed. Cl. at 275 (noting that wetlands
mitigation set-aside had effect of increasing value of plaintiff’s
property).
96 Parking Ass’n of Ga., 264 Ga. at 764.
97 Id.
98 Id. (“The zoning ordinance does not authorize a permanent
physical taking or occupation of plaintiffs’ property by another;
it merely regulates the use of plaintiff’s’ property.”)
99 Id. at 765-66.
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Zoning and the Equal Protection
Clause

health, safety or welfare, they may be struck down under
the Equal Protection Clause.105 However, even where
there is no legislative history or express findings, so
long as there would be a legitimate state interest under
any conceivable circumstance, a zoning ordinance will
be upheld.106 Therefore, for a plaintiff to prevail on an
Equal Protection Clause challenge, they must establish
that they have been treated differently than similarly
situated persons and that the local government has no
conceivable rational basis for the disparate treatment.107

In addition to challenging open space requirements under
the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause, developers
and property owners have sought to challenge zoning
regulations under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal
Protection Clause.100 In such claims, plaintiffs allege
that because an open space requirement is not imposed
uniformly upon an entire jurisdiction, but rather is distinct
to specified zones within a city or county or to specified Based on the highly deferential equal protection analysis
developments, the local government does not afford all that almost always upholds a challenged land use
of its citizens equal protection under the law.101
ordinance, courts have struck down equal protection
challenges to minimum lot size requirements based
Courts have been hesitant to find equal protection on finding either a lack of disparate treatment or the
violations based on land use ordinances and, accordingly, presence of a rational basis for the disparate treatment.
have required very specific showings to establish For example, in Mayhew, the plaintiffs alleged an
violations of the Equal Protection Clause.102 Courts have Equal Protection Clause violation where the town
acknowledged that in the area of land use planning it is of Sunnyvale, Texas rejected their application for a
frequently impossible to provide any definite reason for development with a density three times that permitted
why one zone has particular land use specifications while by the minimum lot size ordinance.108 The plaintiffs
another zone does not.103 Therefore, because “[l]and use claimed that other developments with higher densities
regulations typically do not implicate any protected class had previously been approved by the same zoning
or fundamental right,”104 zoning authorities must only commission.109 The Supreme Court of Texas determined
provide a rational basis for their land use decisions.
that the Equal Protection claim failed because the
plaintiff was not similarly situated to those other parties
Although a “rational basis” does not require a significant whose developments had been approved by the city.
showing on the part of a local government, the local Specifically, the court noted that the plaintiff’s proposed
government must be able to offer at least some justification 1200 acre development would have a much greater
for its land use decisions to show that its actions are impact on the community than other landowners who
not arbitrary. Accordingly, where land use restrictions sought to construct buildings on much smaller parcels of
such as open space or minimum lot size requirements land.110 By contrast, in LaSalle National Bank, plaintiffs
cannot be found to bear some relationship to the public
100 See e.g., Board of Sup’rs of James Cty. Cnty. v. Rowe, 216
S.E.2d 199, 206-07 (Va. 1975) (plaintiff alleged Equal Protection Clause violation based on different zoning classifications
on adjacent properties).
101 See id. at 203-04 (discussing plaintiff’s claim that variation in open space requirements with adjoining property denied
them equal protection under the law).
102 See id. at 206 (requiring evidence of discrimination
against the plaintiff to overcome presumption of validity carried by zoning regulations in adjacent areas).
103 Id. (quoting W. Bros. Brick Co. v. Cty. of Alexandria, 192
S.E.2d 881, 886 (1937) (“It is seldom that there is any definite
reason for holding that a lot on one side of a line should be
devoted to one purpose and that just across it to anther.”)
104 LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Cty. of Highland Park, 799 N.E.2d
781, 798 (Ill. Ct. App. 2003).
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105 Rowe, 216 S.E.2d at 211 (finding landowners overcame
legislative presumption to invalidate twenty-nine percent open
space requirement because requirement would have left no
space for parking at commercial buildings and requirement
was not justified by local government under any of its police
powers).
106 Central States, Southeast, & Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Midwest Motor Express, Inc., 181 F.3d 799, 806 (7th
Cir. 1999). See also Marshall, 912 F.Supp. at 1474 (noting that
state does not have to articulate actual objective of regulation
as long as court can conceive of facts that justify state-imposed
classification).
107 Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000).
108 Mayhew, 964 S.W.2d at 926.
109 Id. at 939.
110 Id.
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alleged Equal Protection violations when their proposal
to develop two homes was denied because it violated the
city’s minimum lot size requirements even though other
proposals that violated the minimum lot size ordinance
had already been approved.111 In assessing the claim,
the court determined that the City of Highland Park’s
concern for protecting the character of the neighborhood
from the use proposed by the plaintiff in that particular
instance served as a sufficiently rational basis for
rejecting the plaintiff’s use variance notwithstanding the
fact that similar use variances had already been approved
by the city.112

the property owner’s investment-backed expectations.
Similarly, if the developer sought to challenge a land use
regulation under the equal protection clause, they would
have to overcome the heavy presumption favoring the
ordinance’s constitutionality by establishing that the
framers of the land use restriction had a discriminatory
intent and that the ordinance bore no rational relation
to any aspect of the local government’s police
powers. Accordingly, it is likely, but not certain, that
constitutional challenges would not prevail against open
space requirements or minimum lot size ordinances.

While it is not impossible for a developer to press
a claim alleging a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause, courts’ deference to local governments’ exercise
of their land use and zoning powers under the rational
basis standard suggests that only in the most egregious
circumstances will a court strike down an open space or
a minimum lot size requirement based on the disparate
treatment of similarly situated individuals.

Conclusion
A developer who seeks to challenge an open space
requirement or a minimum lot size ordinance as either
an unconstitutional taking or a violation of the United
States Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection will
inevitably face an uphill battle. While a developer might
succeed in establishing that an open space requirement
is unconstitutional as an exaction if they can prove that
the condition on development imposed by the city either
does not bear a “substantial nexus” to the problem that
the city seeks to address or is not “roughly proportional”
to the development’s contribution to that problem, it is
more likely that a court would consider any open space
requirement under a regulatory taking analysis. Under
this categorization, the developer would have to establish
that, on balance, the interest pursued by the government is
not sufficiently important to justify the economic impact
inflicted upon the property owner or the damage done to
111 LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 799 N.E.2d at 798.
112 Id. at 799. See also Marshall, 912 F.Supp. at 1474 (concern for having sufficient number of wells, aquifers, and septic
systems was legitimate state interest justifying minimum lot
size and other restrictions on proposed development).
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